More than a year after the Titan submersible imploded, killing all five voyagers on board, the story of the ill-fated expedition to the Titanic has taken the form of a modern-day Greek tragedy overflowing with mortal pride and heedlessness.
Testimony during the first week of a hearing by a U.S. Coast Guard panel probing the disaster has painted a damning portrait of the Washington-based company that developed and operated the 23,000-pound submersible as well as its founder 鈥 who charged deep-pocketed passengers about US$250,000 per dive.
鈥淲hat this really comes down to is hubris and greed,鈥 Peter Girguis, a Harvard University professor and oceanographer who has been monitoring the hearing, told CNN.
鈥淚t鈥檚 both tragic and ironic that this example of hubris occurred within a few 100 meters or yards of another example of hubris, which is the Titanic,鈥 he added, referring to another infamous maritime disaster involving what was the largest passenger ship in service and considered 鈥渦nsinkable鈥 when it struck an iceberg in 1912.
Since Monday, people who once worked with exploration promoter OceanGate and others described a terse final message sent seconds before contact was lost, what one witness called a 鈥渟moke and mirrors鈥 company culture centered on profits rather than science, a malfunction of the Titan just days before it imploded and repeated dire warnings that were ignored before disaster struck 15 months ago.
Stockton Rush, the founder and CEO of the vessel鈥檚 operator; businessman Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son, Suleman Dawood; businessman Hamish Harding; and French diver Paul-Henri Nargeolet were all killed. Those remains were matched to the five men on board through DNA testing and analysis, according to the Marine Board of Investigation.
鈥淥ne thing that needs to be very clear is that there has been up to this point a perfect track record in deep submersions,鈥 Chris Roman, a professor at the University of Rhode Island鈥檚 Graduate School of Oceanography, told CNN. 鈥淭he second is, it鈥檚 not a cavalier, high risk, every dive is like a daredevil event if done properly 鈥 There鈥檙e no shortcuts here, especially in this business. And if you cut corners, it will bite you.鈥
Here are some takeaways from the hearing鈥檚 first week:
'All good here' and then one final message
One of the final haunting messages from the Titan submersible was delivered at 10:14 a.m. local time in Newfoundland, Canada, according to an animation from the Coast Guard hearing: 鈥淎ll good here.鈥
Half an hour later, about 10:47 a.m. local time, the Titan sent another message to its mother ship, the Polar Prince, saying it had 鈥渄ropped two wts鈥 鈥 referring to weights the submersible could shed to either return to the surface or to ease its descent into the dark, hostile deep. In six seconds, contact was lost.
A lawsuit by the family of one victim has claimed the message 鈥 about 90 minutes into the drive 鈥 was an indication the crew might have known something was wrong and were trying to abort the mission.
Seconds after that brief communication, the Titan was 鈥減inged鈥 for the last time, according to the opening presentation of the two-week hearing.
Days later, authorities found its wreckage on the floor of the North Atlantic Ocean, several hundred yards from the remains of the Titanic, according to the Marine Board of Investigation, which is the highest level of inquiry by the Coast Guard.
The submersible lost contact with its mother ship the morning of June 18, 2023. When it failed to resurface, a dramatic international search and rescue mission unfolded in the remote waters several hundred miles southeast of Newfoundland.
Authorities concluded the vessel had suffered a 鈥渃atastrophic implosion,鈥 a sudden inward collapse caused by immense pressure. Near the debris on the sea floor, 鈥減resumed human remains鈥 believed to belong to the victims were recovered.
Until that morning, a manned deep-ocean submersible had never imploded, according to industry experts.
'Smoke and mirrors' and cutting corners on safety
A key witness during the hearing鈥檚 first week was David Lochridge, a former director of marine operations for OceanGate, who had expressed concerns about the safety of the Titan submersible.
OceanGate鈥檚 company culture was centered on 鈥渕aking money鈥 and offered 鈥渧ery little in the way of science,鈥 Lochridge testified.
Lochridge described a 2018 report in which he expressed safety concerns over OceanGate operations and said, 鈥淭here was no way I was signing off on this.鈥 He had 鈥渘o confidence whatsoever鈥 in the submersible鈥檚 construction, he testified.
Lochridge said his responsibility was to ensure the safety of all crew, clients and training pilots but he felt more 鈥渓ike a show pony鈥 because no one else was qualified as a pilot.
鈥淚t was all smoke and mirrors,鈥 he said of the way the company operated. 鈥淎ll the social media that you see about all these past expeditions. They always had issues with their expeditions.鈥
The manufacturer of the Titan鈥檚 viewport 鈥 an acrylic window on the submersible 鈥 had built and certified it for a depth of 1,000 metres, or about 3,280 feet. But Lochridge said OceanGate intended to take the vessel 鈥渢o 4,000 metres (13,123 feet) with passengers who are unaware of this.鈥
Lochridge said OceanGate and Rush ignored the manufacturer鈥檚 concerns and its offer to construct a viewport certified to a depth of more than 13,000 feet. Instead, Rush had the viewport designed in-house by OceanGate and manufactured by a third party.
Rush鈥檚 vision 鈥渨as, give somebody this PlayStation controller and within an hour they鈥檙e going to be a pilot,鈥 Lochridge testified. 鈥淭hat鈥檚 not the way it works.鈥
Lochridge, who said he was eventually fired in 2018 after raising the alarm over safety issues, added: 鈥淭hey wanted to be able to qualify a pilot in a day, someone who had never sat in a submersible. They wanted people to basically come in, get checked out as pilots and be able to take passengers down in the sub.鈥
A transcript of Lochridge鈥檚 exit interview with Stockton Rush and other OceanGate staff showed the tension between the two company leaders. The redacted transcript was released during the Coast Guard hearing.
Rejecting Rush鈥檚 鈥済ung-ho鈥 attitude to incrementally testing the Titan鈥檚 depth capabilities through manned dives, a speaker, presumably Lochridge, explained, 鈥淭he main thing which you are sweeping under the carpet here is if something goes wrong with you being in that submersible, OK, (your) topside support, those are the ones that are left with the outcome 鈥 Those are the ones that are left to answer to the accident investigation team. OceanGate is done.鈥
OceanGate has faced mounting scrutiny of its operations in recent years amid reports of safety issues. Former employees described a company and a top executive who cut corners and eschewed oversight in the haste to embark on missions with a poorly designed submersible.
鈥淭hey did not build a safe vehicle. And I was advising people for, oh god, three years before the tragedy, people had asked me and I told them, 鈥楧on鈥檛 go anywhere near it,鈥欌 retired Navy captain, submariner and deep-sea explorer Alfred McLaren, told CNN.
鈥淎nd then, of course, there鈥檚 tests you go through and certifications 鈥 but they avoided all this to save money or and to, I guess, putting it one way, to get down to Titanic as soon as they can taking all these chances,鈥 said McLaren, a friend of Nargeolet, one of the people who was on board the Titan when it imploded.
Rush, an aerospace engineer, was intent on making deep-sea voyaging accessible to wealthy tourists and researchers by willingly breaking the rules with what experts described as an experimental submersible operated without rigorous testing, according to testimony at the hearing.
鈥淭here have always been adventurers who push the envelope and put their lives at risk. Experimental aircraft, spacecraft. There are people who are willing to put their lives on the line to push the envelope and technology to drive exploration forward. This is an example of someone who put their life on the line and the lives of four other people, and that part was reckless,鈥 Girguis said. 鈥淭he point is, we have to be mindful of folks like Stockton Rush, who needlessly put other people鈥檚 lives at risk.鈥
Representatives for OceanGate declined to comment on questions about the testimony regarding Rush. In a statement, the company said it was no longer operating, extended its condolences to relatives of the victims and noted it was cooperating with the Coast Guard and U.S. National Transportation Safety Board investigations.
鈥淭here are no words to ease the loss endured by the families impacted by this devastating incident, but we hope that this hearing will help shed light on the cause of the tragedy,鈥 the company said.
David Marquet, a retired U.S. navy submarine captain, told CNN, 鈥淚t鈥檚 too simplistic to say, 鈥楾hese are just a bunch of reckless villains,鈥欌 referring to Rush and others at OceanGate.
鈥淚鈥檓 always a little bit sympathetic with guys typically trying to push the boundaries. But in this case, the risk/gain calculations were just way off,鈥 he said. 鈥淭he CEO was in the submarine when it imploded, so it鈥檚 not like he wasn鈥檛 putting his money where his mouth was.鈥
Clashes with the CEO and issues on previous dives
Renata Rojas, who paid to be part of a Titan expedition as a mission specialist, was emotional at times as she testified about her sense of confidence in what she called the transparency of the company during her time as a volunteer. Every dive was followed by debriefings where all issues were openly discussed, she said.
鈥淚 found them to be very transparent about everything. Anybody could ask any questions,鈥 said Rojas, who described staff as hardworking and 鈥渁mazing people鈥 who wanted 鈥渢o make dreams come true.鈥
Rojas became emotional when she talked about seeing the passengers 鈥 鈥渇ive people smiling鈥 鈥 on the ill-fated voyage, excited and eager to embark on their mission that June morning.
鈥淭hey were just very happy to go. That鈥檚 the memory I have,鈥 Rojas said, crying. 鈥淣obody was really nervous. They were excited about what they were going to see.鈥
She added, 鈥淣othing is going to bring our friends back.鈥
Rojas also gave an account of a 2016 submersible crash during a dive to the Andrea Doria shipwreck that differed from Lochridge鈥檚 version of the episode. Rush panicked while piloting the Cyclops 1 submersible to the place where the Italian passenger liner went down on a fog-shrouded summer night in 1956.
Lochridge testified he was supposed to pilot the submersible and objected when Rush decided he wanted to pilot the vessel. He eventually convinced Rush to allow him to join the dive.
Rush made multiple errors during the dive, Lochridge said, including ignoring issues with the current and keeping his distance from the wreck.
Lochridge said he tried to guide Rush but the CEO kept fighting back and eventually drove the submersible 鈥渇ull speed鈥 into the Andrea Doria wreckage.
鈥淎t that point, it was unprofessional behavior of him, he started to panic, and the first thing was, 鈥楧o we have enough life support on board?鈥欌 Lochridge recalled, noting he had to calm him down.
鈥淲e鈥檙e stuck, we鈥檙e stuck, we鈥檙e stuck,鈥 he quoted Rush saying.
Lochridge said he asked Rush to give him the PlayStation controller but Rush refused.
鈥淛ust remember I鈥檓 the CEO, you鈥檙e just an employee,鈥 Lochridge recalled Rush telling him.
Rojas 鈥渟houted at Stockton to give me the effing controller, she had tears in her eyes.鈥 according to Lochridge, who said Rush threw the controller at him and he ultimately piloted the submersible to safety.
But Rojas recollection of what happened contradicted Lochridge鈥檚 version.
鈥淚 did see David Lochridge鈥檚 account of the events, he must have gone on a different dive,鈥 she testified. 鈥淣obody was panicking, nobody was crying and there was definitely no swearing and yelling.鈥
She said she did not know why Lochridge took the controls from Rush and recalled the CEO set the controller at Lochridge鈥檚 feet.
鈥淚 can tell you that I did not use any foul language and I was not really the one to ask Stockton to give the controller to Lochridge,鈥 Rojas testified.
And there were other accounts of troubled dives.
Steven Ross, a marine scientist and crew member of Dive 87 on the Titan鈥檚 fourth mission in 2023, testified a platform malfunction on that trip just six days before the implosion caused all five people onboard to slam to the aft of the submersible for at least an hour.
The dive was aborted. Upon resurfacing, it was discovered the platform malfunction was caused by an issue with the variable ballast tank, which controlled the submersible鈥檚 buoyancy. The issue resulted in the platform inverting 45 degrees with the back bow facing upward, according to testimony.
The dive, with Rush at the helm, took place on June 12 about 460 miles from the Titanic site.
鈥淭he pilot crashed into the rear bulkhead, the rest of the passengers tumbled about. I ended up standing on the rear bulkhead, one passenger was hanging upside down, the other two managed to wedge themselves into the bow endcap,鈥 Ross said, adding no one was injured.
Rush had told passengers there was a problem with the variable ballast tank valve, according to Ross. The platform malfunction took considerable time to correct, the dive was aborted and they returned to the surface to fix the issue.
Ross also testified about two incidents during the 2022 Titanic expedition dives, including a loud bang heard while surfacing in Dive 80.
鈥淭here was a discussion about the bang with the crew, mission specialists and the scientists. The theory of the sound was that there was likely a shifting of the pressure hull in its metal cradle that when it popped back into place it could鈥檝e made that loud noise,鈥 Ross said.
And on Dive 81, Ross said, there was a malfunction of the thrusters. The pilot, Scott Griffith, discovered the controls for one of the thrusters were reversed when they were at the bottom. Griffith had to operate the thrusters with the reversed controls.
Before the Titan鈥檚 fourth mission for the 2023 Titanic expedition, Ross said he was told the submersible 鈥渟nagged an obstruction while being towed at night.鈥 It was assumed to have been caused by abandoned fishing gear 鈥渂ut that was not conclusive鈥 and he was not made aware of any damage caused by the obstruction, Ross testified.
Patrick Lahey, the CEO of Triton Submarines, testified he saw the Titan in March 2019 while in the Bahamas and was 鈥渘ot impressed.鈥 He said he told OceanGate staff members how he felt.
鈥淚t just didn鈥檛 seem to me that it had been particularly well-thought-out or executed,鈥 he said of the submersible. 鈥淚 saw evidence where they were crimping cables to hold on weights. It just looked amateurish in its execution. I kind of left that visit thinking, well that鈥檚 a relief, I don鈥檛 think that will ever take people on any significant dives and obviously I underestimated their tenacity.鈥
OceanGate mission specialist Fred Hagen, testifying on the last day of the hearing鈥檚 first week, acknowledged the Titan 鈥渨as never supposed to be safe.鈥
鈥淎nyone that felt safe going to depths in the Titan was deluded or delusional. It was an experimental vessel. It was clear that it was dangerous,鈥 Hagen said. 鈥淵ou don鈥檛 do it because it鈥檚 safe, you do it because it鈥檚 an adrenaline rush.鈥
Girguis, the Harvard oceanographer, told CNN: 鈥淎s we all watch the testimony, I think the question we should be asking ourselves is, We don鈥檛 want to stifle exploration but how do you protect lives and stop this kind of deception from happening again?鈥
CNN鈥檚 Dakin Andone, Alaa Elassar and Cindy Von Quednow contributed to this report.
