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OTTAWA - The head of the Air India inquiry is accusing the federal government of trying to undercut James Bartleman's startling testimony about what transpired in the days leading up to the deadly 1985 bombing.

John Major, in a pointed intervention at the hearings Monday, observed that there seems to be an "effort by government to discredit Mr. Bartleman."

The former Supreme Court justice went on to express concern that Gordon Smith, Bartleman's former boss at the Foreign Affairs Department, appeared to have aligned himself with that effort.

"You're just falling into line with the others," Major interjected as Smith was fielding questions from lawyers.

"I'm not questioning your sincerity, but it's obvious that they don't like that testimony (by Bartleman). You are one of several who seem upset by that evidence."

Bartleman, now Ontario's lieutenant-governor, stunned the inquiry last week by declaring that he had seen an electronic intercept, just days before the bombing, that suggested Air India would be targeted by terrorists the following weekend.

The assertion contradicted two decades of repeated claims by the federal government that, despite a multitude of generalized warnings, there was never any hard and specific intelligence predicting a particular Air India flight would be in jeopardy.

Smith, who was then associate deputy minister of foreign affairs, indignantly rejected the contention that he was part of a concerted campaign to undermine the credibility of Bartleman, describing him as a friend for whom he had the "utmost respect."

But he went on to question whether Bartleman's memory of the incident was accurate. And he said that, if it was, his friend should have alerted his bureaucratic superiors immediately rather than waiting 22 years to go public.

"I am upset by his evidence because if there was a senior officer reporting to me who had information that, if correctly used might have stopped this disaster, I have a feeling of responsibility," said Smith.

The exchange followed testimony Monday by William Warden, former high commissioner to New Delhi, who said he had no difficulty believing there was advance intelligence about the June 1985 attack that claimed 329 lives.

"I was not surprised that a specific piece of information should have been identified which purported to give specific details as to the plot," said Warden.

Like Smith, however, Warden wondered why other officials couldn't remember seeing the same intercept that Bartleman spoke of in the week before the tragedy.

"If such a piece of information existed there must have been at least a dozen people, or half a dozen people at the very least, who would have seen such a piece - and some of whom would have been scurrying to do something about it."

Warden said if similar intelligence had come to him he would have quickly kicked it upstairs to more senior officials at Foreign Affairs.

"I would have been running all over the place with it. ... I can't imagine that I would have done other than stir up a hornet's nest."

Bartleman has testified that he let the matter drop after he brought the information to one RCMP counter-terrorist officer who told him he already knew about the intercept and didn't need any help doing his job.

Warden said he was under constant pressure in 1984-85 from the Indian government, which contended that Canada wasn't taking the threat of Sikh terrorism seriously enough.

He recalled that he shared the Indians' frustration and questioned whether Ottawa had acted strongly enough to counter violent demonstrations, harassment and threats to Indian diplomats stationed in Canada.

A stronger "political will" and a more forceful public denunciation of those incidents could have nipped things in the bud and perhaps helped to head off the bombing, said Warden.

"I still have that feeling of frustration that the government machinery did not seem able to get its act together and to really step in at an early stage ... It may have served to take the wind out of the sails of some of these people."

Documents tabled at the inquiry show that - Bartleman's testimony aside - Air India had sent a series of more general warnings to Canadian authorities saying it feared a terrorist attack.

One RCMP memo indicates that warnings of some kind were received before virtually every flight departing Canada. Some officials believed the airline was overstating its case in the hope of inducing authorities in this country to beef up pre-flight security at Canadian expense, rather than leaving Air India to pick up the tab.

Indian diplomats in Ottawa also waded into the intelligence morass in April 1985, advising Canadian officials that they had information an Air India flight bound for Canada could be hijacked before reaching its destination.

Smith said he couldn't even remember that warning until his memory was jogged by the documents on file with the inquiry - mainly because nothing ever came of the threat.

He also testified there was no real need to keep him personally informed of all the other warnings that had circulated for months among police and security officers.

But he continued to insist that Bartleman should have told him about the intercept of June 1985 because it was so unique. "When you've got a piece of information like that you take it up the line very quickly."

Bartleman's failure to do so suggests his memory may have been playing tricks on him when he testified about the affair last week, said Smith.