麻豆影视

TORONTO -- Activists, experts and policy makers are speaking out on what they describe as an ever-growing 鈥渋nfluence鈥� of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Canadian business, academic and political circles.

There has been mounting scrutiny on the CCP鈥檚 increased flexing of its intelligence muscles since the ascension of President Xi Jinping in 2013.

Canada鈥檚 intelligence agencies have taken the rare step of naming China as a significant threat to the country鈥檚 sovereignty, with CSIS director David Vigneault publicly saying in a February 2021 speech that Canadians are being 鈥渁ggressively鈥� targeted by foreign interests 鈥� and Beijing was engaged in 鈥渁ctivities that are a direct threat to our national security and sovereignty.鈥�

The of the 2020 National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) annual report said 鈥渢he threat from espionage and foreign interference is significant and continues to grow鈥� and that 鈥渋ntelligence shows that China and Russia remain the primary culprits.鈥�

In the recent parliamentary meeting of the Special Committee on Canada-China relations (CACN), Carolyn Bartholomew, chair of the U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission, testified that the 鈥渟hared values鈥� of Canada and the U.S. are 鈥渋ncreasingly in conflict with and under assault鈥� by the CCP.

Citing comments from FBI Director Christopher Wray, Bartholomew told the committee that there isn鈥檛 鈥渁ny country that presents a more severe threat to our innovation, our economic security and our democratic ideals鈥� than China.

Hong Kong pro-democracy activists say they have been wary of reporting harassment and silencing tactics to Canadian authorities, that they attribute to CCP agents, because of 鈥渓arge scale infiltration鈥� of Chinese state interests in Canada.

鈥淯nder the Chinese Communist regime, Chinese Communist Party members have an executive decision role in all of the companies and NGOs that operate out of China,鈥� Cherie Wong, executive director of Alliance Canada Hong Kong, explained to CTVNews.ca in an interview.

Wong鈥檚 observations were seconded by Charles Burton, senior fellow at the MacDonald-Laurier Institute and an expert on Canada-China relations.

• Read more: Hong Kongers say they're being targeted in Canada

鈥淎ll business enterprises in China, whether they're state-owned enterprises or non- state-owned enterprises, have at the peak of their organization the Chinese Communist Party branch, which coordinates the activities of every organization so that it serves the interests of all,鈥� Burton said in a telephone interview with CTVNews.ca.

Burton, using the example of Chinese telecom giant Huawei, said that 鈥渦nder Chinese law, all Chinese citizens are required to cooperate with the Chinese intelligence and security services if asked鈥�If the Chinese state wanted to use Huawei to obtain personal data files or to identify means to sabotage critical infrastructure, then they would be required to provide that.鈥�

Huawei did not respond to repeated requests for comment from CTVNews.ca.

Burton said the ultimate goal of the CCP鈥檚 interference in Canada is to 鈥渞ender Canada subordinate to China as the superior power,鈥� and supersede their cultural and political values to Canada鈥檚 which he describes as an 鈥渆normously ambitious scheme.鈥�

鈥淲hether it鈥檚 feasible in terms of implementation is highly debatable,鈥� he said, adding that this belief hinges on CCP messaging that the West is in decline, and China will fill a power vacuum previously filled by the U.S.

UNITED FRONT WORK DEPARTMENT

A member of the pro-democracy group Halifax Hong Kong link, who 麻豆影视 has agreed not to name out of fear of reprisals, said a vast CCP network operating in Canada is the .

The UFWD was a Leninist concept adopted by the Chinese communists and what Chairman Mao referred to as one of the three treasures of the Dharma, or 鈥渕agical weapons,鈥� Burton explained. The other two treasures are the People鈥檚 Liberation Army (PLA) and the CCP itself.

The UFWD is 鈥渄esigned to sort of pave the way for the Chinese Communist Party鈥檚 longer-term plan,鈥� he said.

CACN Chairperson Bartholomew called the UFWD a 鈥渕ajor tool for CCP influence鈥� which seeks to 鈥渃o-opt and neutralize sources of potential opposition to the policies and authority of the CCP鈥� and 鈥渋nfluence non-ethnic Chinese foreign elites.鈥�

The 鈥渆lites鈥� are usually politicians or businesses with a lot of social capital and influence, and are co-opted 鈥渢hrough offering them benefits to at least passively collaborate with the purpose of the party,鈥� Burton said.

鈥淲e do see the phenomenon of Canadian policymakers who are not aggressive in challenging the threats of the People's Republic of China in Canada, who after retirement receive board memberships and other benefits from Chinese Communist Party associated institutions that allow them to prosper in retirement,鈥� he said.

However, Bartholomew added at the parliamentary meeting that in light of increasing anti-Asian hate crimes, any discussion of UFWD or CCP influence has to be 鈥渃areful to always draw a distinction between the CCP and the Chinese people.鈥�

Bartholomew said one of the major targets for the UFWD is Chinese-language media in non-Chinese countries, which they 鈥渟eek to co-opt or outright control,鈥� ensuring the CCP controls the flow of information available to Chinese speakers. She used the example of the China News Service as a media agency controlled by the UWFD.

MOBILIZING STUDENTS

The UFWD also 鈥渙ffers benefits and support鈥� for Chinese students on campuses, Bartholomew said, and in return the students are 鈥渆xpected to rebut any criticism of the CCP and encourage the support for the CCP鈥檚 global rise.鈥�

She said uncooperative students face 鈥渓everage鈥� such as threatening family members back in China.

Stephanie Carvin, an ex-Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) analyst and associate professor of international relations at Carleton University, said tracking and tracing activities by the UFWD are difficult.

鈥淲e have seen direct links between the [Chinese] consulate to the embassies and, for example, student groups,鈥� Carvin explained, . WeChat messages from Chinese student groups showed they coordinated with the Chinese officials to try to stymie the talk and report on which academics attended.

鈥淏ut other than that, when you see people protesting and stuff like this, how do you prove they're doing it on behalf of a government or on behalf of a government agency?鈥� she said.

Burton said there are 鈥渁n awful lot of Chinese diplomats in Canada鈥� who have education offices that engage with the Chinese student and scholar associations to 鈥渙btain information about what鈥檚 going on on campus and possibly facilitate the transfer of technologies that are developed on campus to China.鈥�

鈥淭hey mobilize these students for various forms of protest, and I think it's very difficult for a student from the People's Republic of China in Canada to refuse a request of their local consulate or embassy because of the pervasive use of files鈥�the embassy could put a negative note in someone's file that could inhibit their ability to have a successful career in China,鈥� said Burton.

In an emailed statement to CTVNews.ca, CSIS said they 鈥減rovide regular unclassified briefings to Canadian entities across a number of important sectors, including Canadian universities, research institutes, and businesses, to ensure they are aware of the threat environment.鈥�

鈥淭hese threats include espionage that targets sensitive data, technological innovation, intellectual as well as foreign interference through the covert manipulation, harassment, and coercion of students and faculty.鈥�

CSIS did not respond to specific queries or allegations, but in its 2020 public report released this month, states 鈥渢he People鈥檚 Republic of China, Russia, and other foreign states continued to covertly gather political, economic, and military information in Canada through targeted threat activities in support of their own state development goals.鈥�

CONFUCIUS INSTITUTES

Every activist interviewed by CTVNews.ca alleged the Confucius Institutes sprinkled across Canada and affiliated with various Canadian academic bodies, had ties to the CCP and the UFWD and was an extension of the propaganda wing of the CCP.

Bartholomew said Confucius Institutes serve as a 鈥渢ool鈥� on campuses to control Chinese students who are there to spread the CCP鈥檚 鈥渨orldview鈥� and serve as a 鈥減latform for espionage.鈥�

There are approximately 13 active Confucius Institutes across Canada.

A member of the Halifax Hong Kong Link group said Confucius Institutes use all-expense paid trips to China for Canadian academics and school administrators as a way of gaining favour, trust and being able to ask for 鈥渇avours鈥� in return. They also allege that the classes offered or any other cultural exchange programs will show 鈥渁lternative, revisionist鈥� versions of historical events that are in line with CCP messaging 鈥� such as that Uyghurs are in 鈥渞e-education camps.鈥�

鈥淏eing associated with a propaganda wing of an authoritarian regime should raise an alarm in Canadian spaces, but yet we have accepted it because it is not really talked about in the mainstream,鈥� Wong said.

A spokesperson for Renison University College in Ontario, which has a Confucius Institute operating on its campus, said in a statement emailed to CTVNews.ca that they 鈥渟trongly reject the allegations鈥� put forward by both the activists and the parliamentary committee.

Despite allegations against the Confucius Institute stretching back several years, the spokesperson for Renison said the allegations, 鈥渋n our opinion, reflect the anti-Asian sentiment that has erupted in the wake of the global pandemic.鈥�

The school did not return further requests for comment by time of publication.

The Edmonton Public School Board also defended its ties with the organization, saying in an emailed statement to CTVNews.ca that 鈥淓dmonton Public Schools has not experienced challenges with the Confucius Institute in regard to claims mentioned. Programming in our schools must align with our Division鈥檚 priorities of accountability, collaboration, equity and integrity.鈥�

The statement did acknowledge that delegates from the Edmonton Public School Board have previously travelled to China to 鈥渞eview and sign鈥� the agreements between the two bodies, which provided 鈥渆nhanced learning experiences for our staff and in turn, our students.鈥�

Burton, however, summed up the Confucius Institutes as 鈥渢roubling.鈥�

INSIDE CANADA鈥橲 RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS

Campuses and research institutions are a big arena for CCP state interests and the UFWD, said Executive Director of Community Family Services Ontario Anna V. Wong (no relation to Cherie Wong).

鈥淚 do know that there are faculties that are heavily supported by foreign funding and if we cannot manage that in a responsible way, they may quickly become a self-censored organization,鈥� Anna V. Wong said in an interview with CTVNews.ca, saying the universities or labs may 鈥渃ensor鈥� themselves or 鈥渄issenting鈥� voices so as not to lose funding.

Bartholomew called UFWD鈥檚 actions on campuses a 鈥渄irect threat to academic freedom.鈥�

Cherie Wong highlighted the target that research funding presents to China and other state actors.

鈥淎s Canada cuts research funding for local researchers, they are looking elsewhere for the funding and very often Chinese researchers, specifically in the field of A.I. and tech and science research, they will come in with large amounts of funding and resources and data and whatever the researchers may want and say 鈥榥o questions asked,鈥欌�� she said.

According to Wong, after the funding and resources are given, the Chinese body will ask for the intellectual property rights to the project, and 鈥渦ltimately our Canadian intellectual property [is] transferred back to Chinese property.鈥�

Wong said this exchange creates a 鈥渄ependency鈥� where researchers in Canada will continue to seek foreign funding to continue their projects.

鈥淭his is where infiltration begins to happen, because once that reliance and dependency has been developed, that Chinese actor can say 鈥榳e need you to also do this so that you could get your funding later,鈥欌�� she said.

The NSICOP report reiterated Wong鈥檚 observations, saying CSIS has determined China and Russia 鈥渁re targeting the same types of science and technology in which the Government of Canada is investing.鈥�

The report said that 鈥淐hina uses 鈥榯alent programs鈥� and academic exchanges to exploit Canadian expertise,鈥� citing the 鈥淭housand Talents Program鈥� established in 2008 which is currently under investigation by the U.S. Justice Department.

The program is alleged to encourage ethnically-Chinese scientists abroad to bring their research to China and therefore transfer the intellectual property to CCP.

Bartholomew said post-secondary institutions have become 鈥渨ay too dependent鈥� on foreign funding and called for transparency in what 鈥渟cientists and researchers are taking money from what Chinese company or the Chinese government.鈥�

HUAWEI AND 5G

Canada remains the only member of the Five Eyes intelligence group that has not announced a decision on whether to restrict Huawei from its 5G network.

Bartholomew said Huawei is at the heart of 鈥淐hina鈥檚 promotion of techno-authoritarianism,鈥� and said that 鈥渟mart cities鈥� who use their service are 鈥渁llowing the Chinese government access, directly or indirectly鈥� to infrastructure like traffic control and water supplies.

鈥淚 think the concept that they are free and independent of the Chinese government is ridiculous,鈥� she said, that Huawei was allegedly able to monitor all calls made on the Netherlands鈥� largest mobile networks KPN.

In Canada, Cherie Wong used the example of the National Sciences and Engineering Research Council (NSERC), which is a federal agency, partnering with Huawei to invest $4.8 million into technology research, with fears that the research could serve Chinese interests.

In 2018, the University of Toronto renewed its research partnership with Huawei for another five years - the telecom company has funnelled millions of dollars into various university projects since 2016.

Huawei has been repeatedly criticized for its alleged role in the CCP鈥檚 internment of Uyghur minority Muslims in camps, where there are allegations of widespread abuse, torture and sexual assault. In January the company backtracked on a patent for facial recognition software that could identify Uyghurs and send out an 鈥渁larm鈥� to authorities.

The Chinese government denies all allegations about the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, instead referring to them as 鈥渞e-education camps.鈥�

The federal Communications Security Establishment (CSE) declined to answer specific queries on Huawei or other cybersecurity threats due to the 鈥渟ensitivities related to foreign intelligence and cyber security operations,鈥� but , which outlines how state-sponsored activity, including from China, is "generally the most sophisticated malicious activity targeting Canadians and Canadian organizations."

The CSE said "the threat of cyber espionage is almost certainly higher for Canadian organizations that work abroad or work directly with foreign state-owned enterprises. In addition, online foreign influence campaigns are almost certainly ongoing and are no longer limited to key political events like elections.鈥�

The RCMP said in a statement to CTVNews.ca the organization is 鈥渁ware of foreign actor interference activity in Canada, from China and other foreign states. Various methods and techniques are in place to combat foreign actor interference within the RCMP鈥檚 mandate.鈥� They did not address specific questions posed by CTVNews.ca or the allegations levelled by the activists.

TARGETING COVID-19 RESEARCH

In addition to academic circles and campus spaces, the NSICOP report and CSIS report highlighted that Russia and China were targeting Canadian COVID-19 research.

鈥淐anada鈥檚 research, biopharmaceutical and life sciences sectors, while already of interest to foreign threat actors, became even more valuable targets as the world raced to develop a vaccine, therapeutics, and other measures to combat COVID-19,鈥� the CSIS report says.

In March, a Canadian vaccine researcher alleged that Chinese government interference derailed a COVID-19 vaccine partnership between the two countries.

The Chinese embassy in Ottawa did not answer queries on specific allegations levelled by the activists or the reports by Canada鈥檚 federal security agencies, emailing a one-line response to CTVNews.ca that 鈥渟uch allegation has no factual basis at all, it is nothing but self-hype and malicious slanders, attempting to sabotage prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Xizang [sic].鈥�

IS CANADA鈥橲 POLICY LACKING?

Carvin said in light of CSIS and other security agencies naming state actors like China as direct threats to Canada鈥檚 sovereignty, there has been pressure to adopt an Australian-style law to address any gaps in the .

Australia鈥檚 鈥淓spionage and Foreign Interference Act鈥� which was brought into parliament in 2018, strengthened their existing laws and introduced new offences for being 鈥渒nowingly鈥� funding or being funded by a foreign intelligence agency.

Burton thinks Canada 鈥渙ught to initiate such legislation,鈥� but warned that it would be very hard for political parties to initiate it as it 鈥渃ould lead to exposure of prominent鈥�and very senior Canadian officials鈥� who are implicated in CCP influence operations.

鈥淭here鈥檚 a tendency to turn a blind eye to this kind of activity,鈥� Burton said, adding the fact that the federal government hasn鈥檛 censured any Chinese diplomats or arrested anyone involved in the harassment of people in Canada 鈥渙n behalf of the Chinese regime is pretty telling.鈥�

Bartholomew said that Canada should adopt a registration act, such as the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act 鈥� which requires the registration of all staff of Chinese state-run entities, media or otherwise 鈥� 鈥済iven that Chinese intelligence gather and information warfare efforts are known to involve staff of Chinese state-run organizations.鈥�

That idea was echoed by expert in CCP political interference, Professor Anne-Marie Brady from New Zealand鈥檚 University of Canterbury in the CACN meeting.

鈥淲e need the system of registering foreign agents, we need the right of transparency that would enable the public and companies to make good decisions about who they鈥檙e partnering with in China,鈥� she said.

Brady said Canada can expect political interference and 鈥渕ass collection鈥� of intelligence by the CCP under Xi Jinping鈥檚 leadership 鈥渋ndefinitely,鈥� and that Canada is in an unbalanced situation when it comes to what it will and won鈥檛 sanction in terms of intelligence operations 鈥� 鈥渨e are not fighting equally.鈥�

Carvin said there are some solid steps she thinks the government should take.

鈥淚 think we need to have a foreign interference coordinator, there鈥檚 little things being done in multiple departments across the federal government鈥�but I don't know to the extent that someone is kind of coordinating across these various departments and agencies,鈥� she said.

Carvin said the advantage of having a coordinator with an 鈥渙versight view of everything鈥� is that they could take the intelligence and briefings done at the federal level and use the information to brief provincial and ministerial levels of government in turn to assist them in seeing the 鈥渂igger picture.鈥�

INTER-AGENCY CO-OPERATION IS POOR

Former senior CSIS intelligence officer and manager Michel Juneau-Katsuya said at the CACN committee meeting that CSIS spends over half its time dealing with foreign influence from China.

鈥淲e see much more interference taking place, many more agents of influence have gained very strategic positions at all three levels of government, municipal, provincial and federal,鈥� Juneau-Katsuya said. 鈥淲hen it comes to prosecution, one problem that exists is within our own system.鈥�

He said that prosecution for foreign interference is the responsibility of the RCMP, but they have been 鈥渙ut of the game鈥� and 鈥渓ost the ability to investigate spy activities鈥� since CSIS鈥� creation in 1984 - and inter-agency co-operation is poor.

鈥淐SIS does not play well with the other kids in the schoolyard, they don't share information that well. They don't share information as they should be sharing information鈥�we have to readjust this,鈥� Juneau-Katsuya said.

Brady agreed, saying that CSIS does not share information publicly 鈥渁s it should.鈥�

She suggested Canada follow Finland鈥檚 example and provide regular courses on disinformation to the public.

Carvin said there鈥檚 still 鈥渁 lot of room for improvement鈥� with how Canadian security agencies operate, but that she believes they are 鈥渂etter than where they used to be.鈥�

鈥淲e shouldn't confuse outreach with transparency, those are two very different things,鈥� she said. 鈥淭ransparency remains a problem in national security.鈥�

Carvin said security agencies and the government have a balancing act when it comes to national security.

鈥淓ven as you recognize these threats, we need to do it in such a way that we're smart about our decisions, that we're not just panicking,鈥� she said. 鈥淐hina, for example, is a sixth of the world's population. You can't ignore that, you can't cut yourself off from that.鈥�

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Edited by Phil Hahn